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Following the financial crisis, the UK’s industrial policy consensus, that liberally regulated competitive
markets were assumed to best determine the composition of economic activity, has come under strain. Martin
Craig argues British governments must overcome their aversion to ‘picking winners’ and embrace their discretionary
role.
In recent decades British economic policy has disavowed ‘picking winners’. Industrial policy has been restricted to a
narrow type of interventionism – ‘competitiveness policy’ – alongside occasional ad hoc subsidies, often to
incentivise inward investors. In the post-2008 context this neoliberal policy consensus has been under strain.
Interestingly, it has been under strain within both governments since 2008 rather than between parties.
Competitiveness policy involves the government making a variety of supply-side interventions with a common
purpose: to better enable market-led industrial development by improving the business environment. They rest on
the neoliberal assumption that it is liberally regulated competitive markets that best determine the composition of
economic activity, and that governments should not seek to improve on the market distribution of economic
resources except where ‘market failures’ occur (scenarios in which markets produce outcomes that limit resources
that firms require, such as a lack of correctly skilled workers). Under the Conservative administrations of the 1980s
and ‘90s competitiveness was pursued first through the liberalisation of labour markets and the economy. Later,
governments began identifying and making up for market failures through public sector investment in areas such as
skills training, research, urban regeneration, and stimulation of private investment in non-corporate firms. What the
interventions had in common was the centrality of the markets as the arbiter of worthwhile developments and the
relegation of public policy to simply ‘lubricating’ them.
This contrasts with the ‘discretionary industrial strategies’ pursued by governments of the past. The discretionary
approach rejects the assumption that the trajectory of economic development selected by liberal competitive
markets is necessarily optimal, even if market failures are addressed. It asserts that industrial policy should identify
investments that the market has not supported but which evidence suggests hold potential for a superior trajectory
of economic development.
The consensus on the exclusive use of the competitiveness approach was never truly complete in Britain. The
business ministry under the Labour governments of 1997-2007/08 was more receptive to the discretionary
instruments than other departments, evident in the grant financing powers of the Regional Development Agencies
and the creation of the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) to co-invest in private sector technology projects that it
deemed of strategic importance to the UK’s economic development. Yet the resources available to these agencies
were never sufficient to supplant the market as the rudder of industrial development.
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In the post-2008 context many of the assumptions underpinning neoliberal economic policy are in question. An
‘unbalanced’ and unstable growth model had developed in Britain, with growth dependent on the effects of
consumer borrowing and the expanding credit that in turn depended upon unsustainable financial sector business
strategies. Long standing issues with productivity growth and investment remained unresolved. The real median
wage stagnated, the balance of trade deteriorated and British manufacturing failed to consolidate a sustainable
position at the top of high value supply chains.
Supporters of neoliberal economic policy point to various impacts of public sector activity and regulation to explain
these problems, while some critical political economists have placed the blame on the very structure of economic
activity that neoliberal economic policy had facilitated. The contrasting prescriptions – a market-led recovery or a
recovery premised on discretionary intervention to shape the composition of economic activity – also appear within
the policies of both governments that have held office since 2008. Both have identified the public sector deficit as a
barrier to recovery. Both have strengthened existing competitiveness policies, whilst the coalition government has
also initiated further rounds of supply-side liberalisation. Yet the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
(BIS) has pursued a rather different agenda alongside this neoliberal one, creating an expanded architecture for
strategic industrial strategy.
Under both governments the department has utilised large funds – SIF and the RGF respectively – to directly
finance private sector capital projects that it deemed likely to yield positive long-term jobs and growth outcomes.
Both have also bolstered the finances of the TSB. Under Peter Mandelson various collaborative testing and
prototyping centers were established to provide capital equipment and development facilitates to firms that would
not otherwise have access to them, whilst under Vince Cable these have been further invested in and consolidated
in the ‘Catapult’ programme. Under both governments, BIS has attempted to identify the needs of strategically
important sectors, publishing strategies detailing a range of targeted interventions. Perhaps most significantly of all,
the department has publicly articulated a diagnosis of Britain’s economic problems to accompany these
interventions in which this discretionary and strategic measures are deemed both possible and necessary to
securing sustainable economic development encompassing a greater role for high value exports.
In the wake of the 2010 spending review the funds available to industrial policymakers have shrunk dramatically,
limiting the extent to which these policies can have an impact and suggesting that the Treasury does not accept the
necessity of the approach that they embody. The historic tension between the business ministry and the Treasury is
thus revealed anew. The continued dominance of the former means that it is Treasury personnel and their
perceptions of what is possible and desirable that have determined the developmental trajectory on which Britain
has embarked post-2008.
Given the abject failure of neoliberal economic policy prior to 2007-08 and the popular perception that political
parties are indistinguishable, 2015 may be a ripe moment for an incoming government to channel greater resources
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into this alternative approach to economic policy. The necessary ideational and institutional resources are already
present in a nascent form. Yet the real challenge is to secure a trajectory of economic recovery and development
that is socially just and environmentally sustainable. If the experience of the past 30 years is anything to go by then
it is unlikely that free competitive markets alone can yield a transition to a low carbon, high productivity, high wage
economy on a timescale consistent with avoiding ecological crisis. To ensure that de-carbonisation occurs and to
seize the economic opportunities that it presents, British governments must overcome their aversion to ‘picking
winners’ and embrace their discretionary role.
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